Election related agencies need to be reviewed

Chadchart Sittipunt (teera.noisakran / Shutterstock.com)

In 1997 Thailand got a new Constitution that is still seen as the best ever. A number of organizations were set up to supervise the proper functioning of the democratic process. In an op-ed in the Bangkok Post, Thitinan Pongsudhirak describes how the coups d'état of 2006 and 2014 with new Constitutions also placed other individuals in these organizations, individuals loyal only to the powers that be the ruling authorities, thus damaging democracy .

Thitinan Pongsudhirak writes:

In any respectable democratic system, a winning election candidate who secured an overall majority of electoral support would take office as soon as possible. However, not in Thailand. When Chadchart Sittipunt defeated 29 rivals by garnering 1,38 million (51%) of the votes cast in Bangkok's gubernatorial election on May 22, the capital's voters had to hold their breath to see if and when the Elections Commission (EC) ) would declare his convincing victory valid.

The way the EC asserted its authority following the recent elections in Bangkok reflects a broader pattern of politically motivated regulation, potentially giving one party advantages over others. Working closely with the Constitutional Court and the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC), the EC determined the election results, regardless of voters' preferences, by dissolving major political parties and barring representatives. It is worth noting that many of them have been in opposition to the conservative-military regime for the past 15 years.

The most recent political parties to dissolve the EC were the Future Forward Party in February 2020 and Thai Raksa Chart a year earlier. The former came in third with 6,3 million votes in the March 2019 general election, while the latter was well on its way to doing well in the same election, until it was thrown out of contention. The seven-member EC, the Constitutional Court and the NACC have formed a collaborative group to trim the margins of the numbers post-election to find their preferred government post-election. As if that were not enough, outright dissolutions of parties were an option and, as a last resort, a military takeover.

This has happened time and time again, as evidenced by the military coup in September 2006, the dissolution of the major parties in May 2007 and December 2008, another coup in 2014, further party dissolutions in 2019-2020 and the rewriting of constitutions in 2007 and 2017.

This is how and why Thailand has a rickety and hopeless coalition government under Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, the leader of the coup eight years ago. It is also how, earlier this year, Jarungwit Pumma was able to move easily from EC Secretary General to Senator position in a matter of weeks, in what seemed like a revolving door between these two coup-produced bodies.

In addition to these three election-related bodies, the offices of the Auditor General, the Ombudsman and the Anti-Money Laundering Service – largely overseen by people appointed from the two coup eras – complement this conservative-military regulatory framework. As a result, elections are a sort of nomination process, where voters' preferences are taken into account, but the final arbitrators decide who comes to power. This is how it works.

Usually, after elections, all kinds of complaints are encouraged and all are accepted by the EC. These complaints about irregularities then become the buttons that the EC can press.

Constitution

Sometimes the NACC can be the channel for complaints, in cooperation with the Constitutional Court. The burden of proof rests on the accused representatives and parties, with arbitrary powers reserved and exercised by these named bodies. Institutions that fought hard before the coups d'état of 2006 and 2014, but that have kept a low profile since the takeover of power by the military and pro-military parties.

The results were striking and are hard to deny. Parties and elected representatives of the anti-military side have somehow been banned, while the pro-military factions have proved immune and can hold office at will. In fact, the affirmation of the EC's authority, along with that of the NACC and the Constitutional Court, has deeper roots dating back to April 2006, when judicial assertiveness—sometimes referred to as “judicialization”—in Thai politics began in earnest. Thailand has been politically shaky and unstable ever since.

In Mr Chadchart's case, the complaints came from Srisuwan Janya, an inflammatory activist whose motives are viewed by many as suspect. He filed a complaint with the EC alleging that the new governor of Bangkok had campaigned with reusable vinyl posters, which amounted to a promise of reciprocity to voters and therefore in violation of electoral law. Another charge from an obscure source suggested that Mr Chadchart insulted bureaucrats by signaling that they should perform better.

To his credit, Mr. Chadchart played it cool. His reaction to the mud slinging, smear campaigns and possible harassment by higher authorities was to focus on working for the well-being of the people of Bangkok. It is a tough task for him as Bangkok mirrors the whole of Thailand in general, with almost two decades of stagnation and decline due to poor and incompetent management. The new governor has some work to do as he is so popular with the public.

The last arbitrators of Thai elections have held popularly elected representatives and political parties to account in the recent past. There's no reason they won't do the same with Mr. Chadchart. Their favorite version of Thailand envisions an erratic party system with mediocre governance and an unstable government. It is easier for institutions such as the military and bureaucracy to maintain power when other sources of popular legitimacy are weakened.

Chadchart can only hope that being in charge of the capital rather than the entire country will lessen the risks he poses to supporters of the conservative-military regime. If Thailand were a ship, these elites don't seem to care if it sinks, as long as they can stay on top and go down last. Promoting a forward-moving craft that can benefit all is detrimental to elite conservative interests because of inherent power shifts and the likelihood of the layers below rising up to have their say.

When the time comes, politicized agencies that oversee elections need to be revamped. They were created with good intentions in the reform-oriented constitution of 1997, but have since been distorted and undermined. Their appointment procedures must be independent and impartial. These election-related bodies should play a coordinating and facilitating role. At most, they can act collectively as an arbiter to ensure fair play, but they cannot be the judge overriding and substituting for the electoral choices of the people.