Impunity after the Tak Bai massacre on October 25, 2004

The Tak Bai massacre (see note 1) on October 25, 2004, left 85 dead and many wounded. None of the perpetrators have ever been brought to justice, while now, twenty years later, the statute of limitations has expired on the crimes. It shows how unjust state violence is rarely addressed or prosecuted, and that applies even more so to the Deep South.

Here I translate the article mentioned below from the New Mandala site.

Impunity instead of justice

Despite calls from victims of the 2004 Tak Bai massacre for accountability, authorities continue to delay legal proceedings – even as the clock ticks on the XNUMX-year statute of limitations.

On October 25, 2004, during the holy month of Ramadan, more than 2000 Malay Muslim protesters gathered outside Tak Bai police station in Thailand's Narathiwat province to demand the release of six men held by authorities. The detainees were accused of supporting insurgent groups active in the region, but many locals believed their arrests were arbitrary and politically motivated. Tensions in Thailand's predominantly Muslim deep south were already high after years of insurgent violence and a heavy-handed government response.

The protest, which was initially peaceful, quickly escalated as security forces used tear gas, water cannons and live ammunition against the crowd. Seven protesters were killed during the initial eviction, with five reportedly shot in the head. After the crackdown, some 1.370 protesters were arrested and taken to the Ingkhayutthaborihan military camp in Pattani, some 150 km away. It was during this journey that tragedy unfolded: 78 detainees died from suffocation and crushing as they were tied up, stacked on top of each other and transported in overcrowded trucks without food, water or ventilation.

The brutality of what soon became known as the Tak Bai massacre shocked Thailand and led to international condemnation. Foreign human rights organizations and local civil society groups denounced the treatment of the detainees, stressing that their transportation under such conditions violated fundamental human rights and international norms. The incident further strained relations between the central government and the predominantly Malay Muslim population in the southern provinces, which has long felt marginalized and discriminated against by the Thai state.

Twenty years later, the massacre remains one of Thailand's most tragic and controversial events, particularly for those affected by the ongoing conflict in the country's southernmost provinces – and the lack of accountability and delay in justice for the victims continues to haunt Thailand's legal system and political landscape.

The ticking legal clock

In the aftermath of the massacre, the Thai government quickly established an independent commission of inquiry to investigate the excessive use of force by security personnel. However, the commission's findings did not result in meaningful legal action against those responsible. On 29 May 2009, the Songkhla Provincial Court ruled on the case, finding that the deaths of the 78 prisoners were due to asphyxiation while being transported in official custody. The court found that the military and police personnel had acted within their duties, despite the evidence of ill-treatment.

The 2009 verdict effectively absolved the officers involved of criminal responsibility and focused on procedural justifications rather than addressing the broader context of human rights violations. Although video footage showed instances of brutality, such as detainees being beaten while being restrained, the court concluded that the deaths were the result of unfortunate circumstances rather than deliberate acts. This decision, criticized by human rights activists, reinforced the perception of impunity within the Thai justice system. In 2012, the government awarded 7,5 million baht per victim in compensation to the families of the victims. However, this financial settlement did little to quell calls for justice.

Despite the fact that the government's investigation committee's work has not resulted in a successful criminal prosecution, two separate cases relating to the Tak Bai incident remain unresolved as the statute of limitations approaches.

The first case stems from a successful application filed in April 2024 by the victims’ families through the Narathiwat Provincial Court to prosecute 14 state officials for murder, attempted murder and unlawful detention. The court accepted the case in August 2024, finding the prosecution’s evidence valid.

However, the trial has suffered several delays. All suspects were ordered to report to court to be told that the case would begin on October 12. However, none of the suspects have appeared in court, including General Pisal Wannatanawongkiri, a former commander of the Thai army in the Deep South and until recently a member of parliament for Pheu Thai. Pisal’s whereabouts remain unknown and there is speculation that he has left the country, adding to frustrations over the slow pace of justice.

In addition, a second criminal case has been initiated by the Attorney General of Thailand, based on files received from the Songkhla Provincial Court and the National Police Headquarters in April 2024. The Attorney General’s decision to file charges came after years of delay and multiple denials of prosecution requests by investigators, and targets eight individuals on charges of “intentional murder with foreseeable consequences.” Under Thailand’s Code of Criminal Procedure, this case is classified as an “extrajudicial killing,” meaning that it involves a death that occurred while the deceased was in the care of a public servant performing his or her duties. The Attorney General subsequently issued an order on September 12, 2024, to prosecute eight suspects in the extrajudicial killing case.

This case rests on the argument that the conditions under which the detainees were transported – cramped, tied up and deprived of basic necessities – amounted to deliberate murder because of the foreseeable consequences of such treatment. The Attorney General found that the officials responsible for transporting the Tak Bai protesters should have known that this could lead to deaths, since there were more than 1000 protesters but only 25 trucks were used for the transport. Six of the eight defendants are junior military officers who served as drivers in 2004; several of them are civilians, and one of them is a senior army officer, General Chalermchai Virunhpet, who is also a defendant in the above-mentioned case brought by the victims’ families.

In both criminal cases, if the suspects do not appear in court by Friday, October 25, 2024, the cases will be considered closed because the 20-year statute of limitations for criminal prosecution will have expired. Despite the late involvement of the Attorney General, the slow pace of progress has caused concern. Thai and international media have closely followed and reported on the case. Romadon Panjor and Rangsiman Rome, MPs from the opposition Prachachon Party, have pressed for the case, but to no avail: the Pheu Thai-conservative coalition government remains ambiguous about the case’s progress. The head of the national police has been tasked with tracking down the suspects and bringing them to court, but efforts have been slow. No security authorities have given interviews about the case. As the statute of limitations approaches, the ability to bring accountability is at stake.

Elections, trust and the peace process

The delayed resolution of the Tak Bai case could have significant political implications for Prachachart and Pheu Thai. Prachachart, which won a majority of votes in Thailand’s three southernmost provinces, is in a precarious position. Tawee Sodsong, the current Minister of Justice and Prachachart MP, has failed to take decisive action to resolve the case. If he fails to deliver justice for Tak Bai’s victims, he risks losing the trust of his voters, many of whom are directly involved in the unresolved case. Such a loss could have serious implications for the upcoming general elections, which could shift political power in the region.
Pheu Thai, which came to power in its previous guise as Thai Rak Thai under Thaksin in 2004, now has a second chance to address its past policy mistakes. Little progress has been made so far. Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Phumtham Wechayachai, a Pheu Thai member, gave ambiguous answers when questioned by reporters about the case. Although high-ranking figures involved in the 2004 incident, including then-army chief Gen. Pravit Wongsuwan, then-Defense Minister Gen. Sampan Boonyanan and Thaksin Shinawatra himself, were not named as suspects by the court, the Tak Bai massacre has nevertheless had a lasting impact on Thaksin and his political party. Since the incident, Thaksin-affiliated parties have never regained their political strength in the Deep South.

Beyond electoral politics, the Tak Bai case is emblematic of a larger problem – the perceived marginalization and mistreatment of the Malay Muslim population by the Thai state. The perception that the government is unwilling to hold the security forces to account has deepened the sense of alienation among the Malay Muslim community. This alienation is exacerbated by the Thai state’s broader counter-insurgency strategies, which have often been criticized for their heavy-handedness and disregard for local sensitivities. Leaving the Tak Bai case unaccountable could fuel new cycles of violence and undermine the ongoing peace negotiations. On September 30, a car bomb exploded near the district chief’s home, wounding two soldiers. Sunai Pasuk, a senior researcher for Human Rights Watch, suggested that the incident could serve as a warning sign from the Muslim opposition group regarding the nearly-closed Tak Bai case.

The judiciary’s handling of the Tak Bai case raises fundamental questions about the role of the Thai courts in addressing state violence. The nearly 20-year delay in prosecuting those responsible highlights broader problems within the Thai justice system, including political interference, a lack of transparency and a culture of impunity. While the courts have occasionally accepted cases and allowed them to proceed, procedural delays and the failure to prevent high-profile suspects have hampered progress. Some might argue that the now belated legal process has been orchestrated to preserve the judiciary’s prestige in the face of public demands, without any genuine intention to resolve the case.

Other major legal obstacles to bringing elite defendants to justice include the constitutional provision protecting MPs from arrest during parliamentary sessions, which was invoked in the case of Gen. Pisal, the fugitive ex-Pheu Thai MP; the complexity of coordination between the judiciary, the attorney general's office and law enforcement agencies has also contributed to the slow pace of legal proceedings.

These institutional failures must be seen within the broader context of state violence and impunity that has been the subject of scholarly theorization. The 20-year failure to resolve the case is particularly poignant evidence for Tyrell Haberkorn’s argument that arbitrary detention in Thailand has provided a vehicle for state perpetrators to abuse Thai law to facilitate human rights violations and ensure impunity. Indeed, in building this theory, Haberkorn has examined the recurrent arbitrary detentions in Thailand’s southernmost provinces over the years, revealing how perpetrators of state violence have consistently enjoyed impunity.

With the statute of limitations in the Tak Bai case soon to expire, the chances of justice becoming increasingly slim. The lack of resolution of this case highlights not only the weaknesses of Thailand’s legal system, but also the political challenges of addressing state violence in a deeply divided society. The outcome of this case could determine the future of the peace process in Thailand’s southern provinces.

The coming days will be crucial to determine whether Pheu Thai, Prachachart, the Attorney General’s Office and other key actors can overcome the obstacles to justice. If they succeed, it could mark a turning point in the region’s history and offer a glimmer of hope to the families of Tak Bai’s victims. If they fail, the legacy of the massacre will haunt Thailand, a stark reminder of the dangers of impunity and the long shadow it casts over peace.

Note 1

Tak Bai (Thai ตากใบ taak bai, low tone, mid tone) is a town in the extreme southwest of Narathiwat province near the border with Malaysia.

20 years after Tak Bai, impunity trumps justice – New Mandala

A video about this event and the aftermath:

Bing Videos

Gift Articles – The New York Times

About this blogger

Tino Kuis

Born in 1944 in Delfzijl as the son of a simple shopkeeper. Studied in Groningen and Curacao. Worked as a doctor in Tanzania for three years, then as a general practitioner in Vlaardingen. A few years before my retirement I married a Thai lady, we had a son who speaks three languages ​​well.
Lived in Thailand for almost 20 years, first in Chiang Kham (Phayao province) then in Chiang Mai where I liked to bother all kinds of Thai with all kinds of questions. Followed Thai extracurricular education after which a diploma of primary school and three years of secondary school. Did a lot of volunteer work. Interested in the Thai language, history and culture. Have been living in the Netherlands for 5 years now together with my son and often with his Thai girlfriend.

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